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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DONALD 0. HART and CINDY HART, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
GLEN SCHIMMELPFENNIG and 
KAREN SCHIMMELPFENNIG, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Appellate Court No. 20080122 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated§78-2a-3(2)(j) as recently renumbered §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
REFERENCE TO PARTIES 
For purposes of clarity, the Plaintiffs/Appellees will be referred to as Hart, the 
Defendant/Appellants will be referred to as Schimmelpfennig, and Lori and Tom Fox, the 
prior owners of the Schimmelpfennig property will be referred to as Fox. (Rule 24(d) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. The Trial Court committed an error in law in concluding that the driveway in 
question was created by an express easement. 
II. The Court committed an error in law in finding that the driveway in question 
constituted an implied easement. 
III. The Court committed an error in law in finding that if an express easement was 
created, the easement must remain substantially on the Schimmelpfennig property, 
rather than being equally located on the property of Schimmelpfennig and Hart. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The finding that an easement exists is a conclusion of law. A conclusion of law is 
viewed for correctness and given no special deference on appeal. Potter v. Chadaz, 977 
P.2d 533, 535 (Utah App. 1999). Mixed questions of fact and law incorporates a defacto 
grant of discretion to the Trial Court, and accordingly, the Trial Court's decision is 
reviewed with deference commensurate to that discretion. State of Utah v. Levin, 144 
P.3d 1096 (Utah 2006). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Butler v. Zee, 744, P.2d 1150 (Utah App. 1989) 
Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah App. 1994) 
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998) 
Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1999) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Schimmelpfennig appeals the decision of Judge Hansen finding that a road between 
the homes of Hart and Schimmelpfennig, which is primarily on Schimmelpfennig's 
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property, was created as an express easement or as an implied easement. The Findings of 
Fact ai i i Conch isioi 1 of I aw ai id Or dei: w si e cit afte :1 b> J i ldge I lai iscn, signed < »n 
December 18, 2007, and recorded with the County Recorder's office on Decembc •' > 
2007. The Court's order granted a permanent injunction prohibiting Schimmelpfennig 
from restricting Hart's access to the driveway which is located on Schimmelpfennig's 
Lot 1 of a 2-lot subdivision. Lori and Tom Fox owned Lot 2 of snid sulidiv isi< in I liirl 
and Fox acquired their lots on April 1 o, ! W4. Ilart and Fox located their homes in the 
center of their lots and Hart's engineer prepared a subdivision plat which designated n 10 
utility easement and access road". Twenty feet of said forty feet were located on each 
party's property. 
Both Hart and iox constructed with Fox's father-in-law to construct the homes The 
weather, fill material was put in place in November or December, and asphalt was put on 
part of the fill material to gain access to the location where the homes were constructed. 
Fw\ .\.u^\ ui i!Kit the asphalt poured over the access road w a > ,. ^aiu! ^ \ M I \ \ * n l; HI s 
portion of the road was located on Fox's property. Fox agreed that the parties would have 
a joint driveway but that it would be equally located one-half on the property of Hart and 
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one-half on the property of Fox. Hart agreed that Fox had the right to use the twenty feet 
on his side of the property line for a driveway. 
Schimmelpfennig acquired Fox's property on March 12, 1999. Schimmelpfennig 
was informed by Fox that the Harts' use of the driveway on Schimmelpfennig's property 
was by permission. Fox informed Schimmelpfennig that there was no written easement 
for access for Hart to use the driveway on Schimmelpfennig's property and that the use 
was only by permission. Schimmelpfennig searched the county records and did not find a 
driveway easement that had been recorded with the county. 
Hart installed a 20-foot by 100-foot concrete pad from his garage to the back of his 
property. Hart has access to the back of his property by that pad. However, Hart used 
portions of Schimmelpfennig's property to access his back field. Hart constructed a fence 
from the rear of his garage to the back of his field which obstructed a majority of the 20-
foot strip that had been designated in the subdivision plot which was located on Hart's 
property. Schimmelpfennig desired to construct a similar fence from the rear of his house 
toward the back of his property so that he could have privacy. When Schimmelpfennig 
attempted to construct the fence, Hart filed this lawsuit seeking an injunction. 
Schimmelpfennig maintains that Hart does not have an easement over his property 
and that his use of the driveway that was located on Schimmelpfennig's portion of the 
property was by permission. Schimmelpfennig maintains that Judge Hansen's findings 
that Hart has an express and/or implied easement over Schimmelpfennig's property is not 
-4-
consistent \. . Jtahlaw. 
STATEMENT OF F..A..C rS 
1. I he property on which the parties' homes are located was owned by Jeffrey and 
Tracy Hansen, and consisted of approximately six. acrcv On Apt il 1 8, 1994, the 
I lai lsei is ti ansferred to I lart, by warranty deed, approximate!) tour acres of said 
piopnly, On llir s.iinr ih\ Ihr lliinscns liiinsfnrnl h\ n iirnnh fiivet, fu I'IHII .iiinl 
Lori Fox approximately two acres of property. The property transferred to the Harts 
is referred to as Lot 1. The property transferred to Tom and Ixxri Fox is referred to 
2. On March i^, iyyy9 - c transfer! ed I ot 2 lx; % ai i anty deed tc 1:1 ite 
Schimmelpfennings. (Defendant's Exhibit 2.) 
3 On May 13, 1994, Hart and Tom and I,ori Fox executed a grant of easement to 
replace utilities and related facilities. That easement was sigi led b> 1:1: le Harts ai I ::l tl i 3 
Foxes and recorded with the Davis County Recorder's Office. (Defendant's Exhibit 
I 
document entitled Don Hart and Tom Fox Hart/Fox Minor Subdivision, which was 
described as a subdivision plat. That document was not signed by the Harts or the 
Foxes, and was not recorded with the County Recorder's Office. Said, document 
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located the homes of Hart and Fox in the center of their lots and created a "proposed 
40-foot-wide utility easement and access road" which was centered between two 
homes with 20 feet on the property of Hart and 20 feet on the property of Fox. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 9 and 9b.) 
5. No road easement was ever created, executed, recorded or accepted by Davis County 
or Farmington City. (Transcript Vol. 1, page 84, lines 3-22.) 
6. Farmington City granted final approval for the creation of a minor subdivision on 
May 31,1994. Building permits were obtained by both Hart and Fox on May 31, 
1994, which authorized construction of the homes to begin on June 1, 1994. 
(Defendant's Exhibits 3, 9 and 9b.) 
7. At the time Hart and Fox acquired the property, they both worked for the same 
paving company. They were able to obtain fill and asphalt paving from the company 
without cost to either party. (Transcript Vol. 1, pages 139, 140.) 
8. Fox paved the road. (Transcript Vol. 1, page 168.) 
9. Fox's father-in-law was contracted by Hart and Fox to build the parties' homes. 
(Transcript Vol. 1, page 122, line 7.) 
10. Prior to obtaining a building permit, fill material was brought onto the property to 
create the pads for the homes. Fill was also used to fill in an area for a driveway 
between the two homes, the location of which was dictated by the home locations. 
Fill was placed between Hart's and Fox's property and homes for a driveway. 
-tf-
(Transcript Vol. 1, pages 49, 50,149 and Defendant's Exhibits 9 and 9b.) 
11. Fill was put in so the property could be developed before access could be had to the 
home locations before November or December of the year. When the fill and the 
asphalt were put down, it was not intended to establish the final location of the road. 
(Transcript Vol. 1, pages 152 through 154.) 
12. Hart and Fox agreed to install a single-lane road. (Transcript Vol. 1, page 131.) 
13. It was intended that the road be down the middle of the property lines and that ten 
feet would be on Hart's property and ten feet on Fox's property. (Transcript Vol. 1, 
pages 149 through 151.) 
14. Fox did not agree that Hart's road could be on Fox's side of the property. 
(Transcript Vol. 1, page 157.) 
15. The asphalt that was placed to gain access to the homes was primarily on the Fox 
property, which was subsequently acquired by Schimmelpfennig. Schimmelpfennig 
had the roadway surveyed to show which portion was on his property and which 
portion was on Hart's property. (The survey line is shown in green on the 
photographs which are part of Defendant's Exhibit 5, pages 3, 4, 5, 6.) 
16. Hart used the paved portion of the driveway during the time Fox lived in the 
property with Fox's permission, and after Schimmelpfennig moved in, with 
Schimmelpfennig's permission. (Transcript Vol. 1, page 158, lines 3-4; Vol. 2, 
pages 33, 34.) 
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17. Hart installed a fence on the twenty feet of the proposed access road without 
consulting with or obtaining permission from Fox. (Transcript Vol.1, pagel58) 
Hart also installed a concrete pad 20 feet wide and approximately 100 feet long from 
his garage to the back of his property on the 20 feet of the proposed access road on 
his portion of the property. (Transcript Vol. 1, pages 89 and 92.) 
18. Hart is able to access the back of his property by use of the 20-foot by 100-foot 
concrete strip on the 20 feet of his property on the proposed road access. (Transcript 
Vol. 1, page 92.) 
19. Hart is able to access his property from the city road without encroaching upon 
Schimmelpfennig's property. (Transcript Vol. 1, page 90.) 
20. Schimmelpfennig attempted to install a fence that extended from his house to his 
property line, which would have prevented Hart from traveling on 
Schimmelpfennig's property to the east which would have prevented Hart from 
using Schimmelpfennig's property to access the rear pasture portion of Hart's 
property. Hart prevented this by filing this lawsuit and obtaining a preliminary 
injunction prohibiting the installation of the fence. (Transcript Vol. 1, pages 15 and 
37.) 
-S-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. EXPRESS EASEMENT 
There was no written document or agreement creating an express easement. Hart 
did not give consideration for an express easement. If there was a verbal or oral 
agreement, Hart did not comply with the agreement. 
B. IMPLIED EASEMENT 
Three of the four elements required for an implied easement were not met. There 
was no unity of title followed by severance. At the time of the severance, servitude was 
not apparent, obvious or visible. The easement is not reasonably necessary for Fox to 
enjoy his estate. 
C. MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF HART 
The evidence viewed most favorably to Hart does not establish an express easement 
or an easement by implication. 
ARGUMENT 
HART DOES NOT HAVE AN EASEMENT OVER SCHIMMELPFENNIG'S 
PROPERTY. 
Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1999) defined the various easements that 
are permitted under Utah law. The court stated, " . . . In Utah, an easement may be 
expressly created by agreement between two parties through either an express grant or an 
express reservation. In addition to express easements, Utah recognizes that actions of the 
parties may give rise to easements by implication and prescription. Finally, Utah law 
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acknowledges that an easement by necessity may be implied due to the nature of the land 
itself " Potter at 536. 
The court stated that an express easement required a conveyance by an express grant 
or an express reservation and that the document creating the grant must sufficiently 
describe the interest in a manner sufficient to construe the instrument as a conveyance of 
interest in land. The court stated, " . . . In addition to the intention of the parties and the 
definiteness of the conveyance, "[a]n express easement . . . requires 'mutual assent by the 
parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms.' Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 
117, 122 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988)). Finally, the conveyance of an express easement requires 
consideration." Id. 
The court defined easement by implication as follows: "There are four elements 
necessary to constitute an easement by implication: (1) unity of title followed by 
severance; (2) at the time of severance the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible, 
(3) the easement is reasonably necessary to enjoy the dominant estate, and (4) use of the 
easement was continuous rather than sporadic." Id. at 538. See also Butler v. Lee, 744 
P.2d 1150,1152 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
A. 
EXPRESS EASEMENT 
Utah law requires that all easements must comply with the statute of frauds by being 
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reduced to writing. The statute of frauds states: "No estate or interest in real property . . . 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner related thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act of 
operation of law or by deed or conveyance in writing." Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-1 
(1989) This court, in the case of Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah App. 1994), 
citing Wells v. Marcus, 25 Ut.2d 242, 480 P.2d 129, 130 (1971) stated: 
'An express easement is a contract that requires "mutual assent by the parties 
manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms."... The conveyance of an 
easement by agreement also requires consideration... There is no written 
instrument or evidence of consideration to support the Millers' easement claim. 
Thus, there is no basis for finding an express easement. Nor is there any evidence 
in the record to support an oral easement. Moreover, even if there were an oral 
grant, it would violate the statute of frauds, which requires that "[n]o estate or 
interest in real property ... nor any trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any matter relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in 
writing."' 
Green at 122 (citations omitted). 
Hart, in his complaint, under its first cause of action for express easement, stated in 
paragraph 18 that Hart owned an express easement for a driveway across the north twenty 
feet of Lot 2, which is Schimmelpfennig's property. Hart stated in paragraph 19 that 
Schimmelpfennig owned an express easement for a driveway across the south twenty feet 
of Lot 1, which is Hart's property. No written document creating an easement for a 
driveway was ever created by Hart or Fox or Schimmelpfennig, and no such document 
has ever been recorded with Davis County. The only document that has ever been created 
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which addresses a right-of-way is a subdivision plat that was created by Hart's engineer, 
Rathbun Engineering, created for the purpose of having Farmington City approve a minor 
subdivision creating the lots for Hart and Fox identified as Lot 1 and Lot 2. A copy of 
that subdivision plat is identified as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 9 and 
9B. 
The subdivision plot lays out a "proposed 40-foot wide utility easement and access 
road", with 20 feet located on Hart's property and 20 feet located on Fox's property. The 
40-foot wide area is located equally between the proposed homes of Hart and Fox. The 
subdivision plat is not signed by the Harts or the Foxes and was not recorded with the 
Davis County Recorder's Office. The document was filed with Farmington City, which 
stamped the document stating, "Final approval under provisions of the subdivision 
ordinances of Farmington, Utah, lots shown in this survey may be recorded and sold by 
metes and bounds." The final approval was dated May 31, 1994. David Petersen, the 
Farmington City planner, testified that the subdivision plat did not create a right-of-way 
or access road that was dedicated to or owned by the city. The subdivision plat must 
show the layout of the homes and must show that the homes have access to a public 
street. He stated that when a subdivision is created, the city does not care about the 
location of a driveway. (Transcript, Vol. 2, page 69-72, 76.) 
On May 13,1994, Hart and Fox executed a grant of easement to Farmington City, a 
municipal corporation, to construct, maintain, operate and replace utilities and related 
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facilities. That easement was signed by the Harts and the Foxes and recorded with the 
Davis County Recorder's Office. (Defendant's Exhibit 4) Clearly Hart and Fox 
understood what had to be done in order to create a valid express easement. No such 
express easement was ever created for a roadway between the adjoining property of the 
parties. 
The property on which Hart's and Fox's homes were built was originally owned by 
Jeffrey and Tracy Hansen, who owned the property as four separate parcels. The Hansens 
combined the various parcels to create approximately 6 one-acre parcels, approximately 4 
acres of which were conveyed to Hart and approximately 2 acres conveyed to Fox. Hart's 
four acres were referred to as Lot 1, and Fox's 2 acres were referred to as Lot 2. Both 
parcels were deeded to Hart and Fox on April 18, 1994. When Hart and Fox acquired 
their lots, they both worked for the same paving company and were able to obtain fill and 
asphalt from the company without cost. Homes could not be built on the lots until fill had 
been added to the lots to build up a foundation for the homes and to build an access from 
the public street in Farmington to home locations. Homes had to be centered on the lots 
so as to meet Farmington City requirements for offsets for the side yards and access and 
distance from the street. The location of the fill in the driveway to access the homes was 
dictated by the location of the homes. 
Hart and Fox agreed to install a single-lane road or driveway to access the homes. 
Hart and Fox had agreed that Fox's father would build the homes. In order to beat the 
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winter weather, fill material was brought in in November or December in order to create 
the location for the homes and gain access to the homes. Asphalt was also put in at that 
time to create a hard surface so that the homes could be built. The fill and the asphalt 
were not intended to establish the final location of the road. The majority of the asphalted 
road is on Schimmelpfennig's property. Schimmelpfennig had a survey done of the 
paved portion of the road, which is evidenced by a dotted green line placed on the asphalt 
as shown in the Defendant's Exhibit 5, photographs 3 -7 . 
Fox testified that it was his intent that the road be built down the middle of the 
property lines so that Hart's portion of the driveway would be on his side of the property 
and Fox's portion would be on his side of the property. 
Fox was called as a witness by Hart. When asked about his intent concerning the 
road, Fox stated: 
Q. WHAT ELSE DID YOU AGREE ON BESIDES THE EASEMENT? 
A. A SINGLE DRIVEWAY COMING IN FOR BOTH HOMES. 
Q. JUST A MINUTE, LET ME QUESTION YOU ON THAT. YOU 
AGREED ON A SINGLE DRIVEWAY. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN 
TO YOU? 
A. LIKE A PRIVATE LANE, OPPOSED TO HAVING TWO 
DRIVEWAYS. AND HE HAD MENTIONED TO SAVE MONEY. 
Q. AND YOU AGREED WITH THAT. 
A. YES, YOU BET. 
Q. DID YOU AGREE AS THE DRIVEWAY'S CURRENTLY 
STRUCTURED? 
A. WE WERE IN SUCH A HURRY GOING INTO THE FALL JUST TO 
GET IT PAVED. WE HAD PUT ALL THE IMPORTED FILL IN. I 
NEVER WENT OUT AND MEASURED ANYTHING. MY FAULT, I 
SHOULD HAVE, BECAUSE 
I WOULD HAVE MADE SURE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HALF ON 
-14-
EACH PIECE OF PROPERTY, AND IT IS NOT. 
Q. DID YOU AGREE TO HOW IT'S CURRENTLY PUT IN? 
A. NO. IT WAS JUST PUT IN SO WE HAD A HARD SURFACE TO 
DRIVE ON FOR THE WINTER. 
Q. OKAY. AND THAT'S HOW IT'S STAYED EVER SINCE? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. AS LONG AS YOU OWNED IT AT LEAST. 
A. YES, SIR. 
(Transcript, Vol. 1, page 122, line 14 through page 123, line 9.) 
• • • 
A. BEFORE HE BUILT HIS SHED AND EVERYTHING? NO. 
Q. YEAH, BEFORE -
A. NO. 
Q. -- HE PUT THE TREES AND FENCE UP. 
A. NO. 
Q. WAS THERE ANYTHING ABOUT THE ELEVATION, THE 
TOPOGRAPHY 
THAT MADE IT ANY -- MADE IT DIFFICULT AT ALL TO PUT A 
ROAD INTO HIS PROPERTY ON HIS SIDE? 
A. NO. 
Q. DID YOU EVEN INTEND THAT HIS USE AND ROAD TO HIS 
HOUSE WOULD BE ON YOUR PROPERTY? 
A. IT SHOULDN'T BE. 
Q. DID YOU EVER INTEND FOR IT TO BE 
A. NO 
Q. -- JUST - JUST HAPPENED -
A. NO 
Q. -- JUST HAPPENED THAT WAY. 
A. RIGHT 
Q. YOU DIDN'T EVER AGREE THAT IT COULD BE THERE; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. NO. 
Q. OKAY. AND DURING THE TIME YOU LIVED THERE. DID YOU 
PERMIT MR. FOX TO USE THE ROAD ON YOUR PROPERTY? 
A. I'M MR. FOX. 
Q. EXCUSE ME. DID YOU PERMIT MR. HART TO USE THE ROAD 
ON YOUR-
-15-
A. NO, HE JUST PUT THAT FENCE IN, PERIOD. 
Q. YOU LET HIM USE THE PROPERTY? 
A. WELL, HE USED IT, YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. HE PRETTY MUCH DID WHATEVER HE WANTED. 
Q. SO EXPLAIN THAT TO ME. 
A. WELL, JUST WHAT -I SAID. HE PUT THAT FENCE IN, HE DIDN'T 
TALK TO ME ABOUT IT. HE JUST PUT IT IN. HE WITNESSED 
AND STATED THAT I APPROVED TO IT. I NEVER APPROVED TO 
IT. 
Q. OKAY 
A. OKAY? 
Q. SO YOU NEVER APPROVED THE FENCE. 
A. NO. I FELT LIKE THAT THE DRIVEWAY SHOULD BE AS PER 
THIS AND AS PER THIS OTHER PICTURE I JUST SHOWED YOU 
WHERE THE GREEN MARK IS. I MEAN THIS - I'LL BE HONEST 
WITH YOU, THIS WHOLE THING'S A JOKE. IT CAN BE 
RESOLVED VERY EASILY. 
Q. HOW IS THAT? 
A. EXTEND THE WIDTH OF THE DRIVEWAY COMING IN, MOVE 
THE DAMN FENCE OFF THE EASEMENT, AND DO IT THE WAY 
IT SHOULD BE. 
Q. SO YOU'RE SAYING PUT HIS PORTION OF THE ROAD -
A. YEAH, LEAVE THE UTILITIES IN, BOTH KEEP THE UTILITIES, 
EXTEND THE WIDTH OF THE ENTRY COMING IN, MOVE THE 
FENCE LIKE IT SHOULD BE. OR ELSE PUT THE GREAT WALL OF 
FARMINGTON DOWN THE PROPERTY LINE. LET EACH OF 
THEM DEAL WITH IT. I MEAN -
Q. OKAY. 
A. -- YOU KNOW, IF PEOPLE ONLY HAD PROBLEMS LIKE THIS IN 
THEIR LIFE, IT'D BE A BEAUTIFUL THING. OKAY? 
Q. HANG ON JUST A MINUTE, LET ME SEE IF I HAVE ANY MORE 
QUESTIONS FOR YOU. 
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
(Vol. 1, page 157, line 1 through pagel59, line 6.) 
When asked about the proposed 40-foot easement and access, Hart 
testified: 
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Q. NOW, YOU'RE CLAIMING THAT YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO USE 
THE 20 FEET ON MR. SCHIMMELPFENNIG'S SIDE OF THE 
PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. I DON'T KNOW THAT I MADE ANY KIND OF CLAIM RIGHT 
NOW, SO -
Q. SO YOU'RE NOT SURE. 
A. I JUST -
MR. JENSEN: OUR HONOR, OBJECTION. COUNSEL -
MR. ECHARD: I THOUGHT HE SAID HE WASN'T SURE. DID I 
MISUNDERSTAND HIM? 
THE COURT: WELL, I'M NOT SURE HE UNDERSTOOD THE 
QUESTION. THAT'S WHAT I THOUGHT. 
RESTATE THE QUESTION. 
MR. ECHARD : SURE. 
THE COURT: AND OF COURSE, THIS IS CROSS-
EXAMINATION. YOU MAY PROCEED. 
MR. ECHARD: THANK YOU. 
Q. (BY MR. ECHARD) ARE YOU CLAIMING THAT YOU HAVE THE 
RIGHT TO USE THE 20 FEET THAT IS SOUTH OF THE PROPERTY 
LINE ON 
MR. SCHIMMELPFENNIG'S PROPERTY? 
A. YES. 
Q. THEN MR. SCHIMMELPFENNIG, IF THAT LOGIC IS CORRECT, 
WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE THE 20 FEET ON YOUR SIDE 
OF THE PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. THAT'S - WOULD BE REASONABLE, YES. 
(Transcript, Vol. 1, page 80, line 8 through page 81, line 6.) 
Q. ARE YOU ACKNOWLEDGING THAT SCHIMMELPFENNIGS -- FOX 
AND THEN SCHIMMELPFENNIGS HAD A RIGHT TO USE THE 20 
FEET ON YOUR SIDE OF THE PROPERTY LINE FOR A DRIVEWAY? 
A. I GUESS THAT'D HAVE TO BE IMPLIED, WOULDN'T IT? 
Q. SO THEY COULD JUST GO CUT YOUR TREES DOWN, KNOCK 
YOUR FENCE DOWN, TAKE OUT THE SPRINKLING, THEN PARK 
AND DRIVE ON THAT AS THEY SEE FIT? 
A. IF IT'S A LIKEWISE DEAL, YEAH. 
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(Transcript, Vol. 1, page 83, lines 7-14.) 
Q. NOW, YOU HAVE NOTHING IN WRITING THAT GIVES YOU ANY 
RIGHT TO USE THEIR PROPERTY FOR YOUR ROAD EXCEPT FOR 
THE EASEMENT WE'VE JUST DISCUSSED -
A. NO, SIR, I DON'T. IT ALL COMES DOWN TO A BASIC 
UNDERSTANDING WHEN WE TOOK POSSESSION OF THE 
PROPERTY AND BUILT IT. 
Q. SO YOU HAVE NOTHING IN WRITING THAT GIVES YOU AN 
EASEMENT ACROSS THE SCHIMMELPFENNIGS' PROPERTY; IS 
THAT CORRECT? 
A. NOT THAT I'M AWARE OF. WE HAD A PROPOSED 40-FOOT WIDE 
UTILITY AND ACCESS ROAD EASEMENT. JUST WAS NEVER 
APPROVED, BUT IT'S RIGHT THERE ON OUR PLAN THAT WE ALL 
BUILT OUR PROPERTIES FROM, AND BASED OUR 
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE WERE GONNA JOINTLY BUILD 
ON THAT PIECE OF PROPERTY. 
Q. BUT YOU CREATED NO WRITTEN DOCUMENT GIVING YOU AN 
EASEMENT. NO ONE DID. 
A. NO ONE DID. 
Q. SO YOU ACKNOWLEDGE YOU DO NOT HAVE AN EXPRESS 
EASEMENT ACROSS THEIR PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. NO, I CAN'T ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BECAUSE I'M NOT SURE. 
(Transcript, Vol. 1, page 84, lines 3-22.) 
Q. SO YOU KNEW THAT IT SAID THERE WAS 20 FEET ON YOUR 
SIDE OF THE PROPERTY FOR A PROPOSED ACCESS ROAD; IS 
THAT CORRECT? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. SO YOU INTENDED THAT IT'D BE A 20-FEET ACCESS ROAD ON 
YOU SIDE OF THE PROPERTY. 
A. I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU'RE GETTING AT RIGHT NOW, SO I 
CAN'T ANSWER THAT ONE YES OR NO. 
Q. SO YOU DON'T KNOW IF YOU INTENDED TO HAVE 20 FOOT FOR 
ROAD ACCESS ON YOUR SIDE OF THE PROPERTY AND -
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A. NO --
Q. -- 20 FOOT ON THE SIDE OF -- THE OTHER SIDE OF THE 
PROPERTY? 
A. YOU KNOW, IT'S SO LONG AGO, CAN'T REMEMBER ALL THAT 
STUFF. 
Q. SO YOU JUST DON'T KNOW. 
A. APPARENTLY NOT. 
Q. SO YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT THE AGREEMENT WAS, IF THERE 
WAS AN AGREEMENT. 
A. NO. 
(Transcript, Vol. 1, page 88, lines 3-21.) 
Hart was the first witness called in the trial. After the Defendant completed his 
portion of the case, Hart was recalled. When asked if he intended by the subdivision plat 
to give Fox or Schimmelpfennig access to 20 feet of property on his side, he stated: 
Q. MY QUESTION IS, DID YOU INTEND BY THIS DIAGRAM HERE TO 
GIVE MR. FOX OR MR. SCHIMMELPFENNIG ACCESS TO 20 FEET 
OF PROPERTY ON YOUR SIDE. YOUR ANSWER WAS NO; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. I THINK IT WAS LIKE TEN FOOT FOR A ROADWAY IS ALL. 
Q. DID YOU INTEND TO GIVE 20 FEET EASEMENT-
A. FOR --
Q. - ON YOUR SIDE OF THE PROPERTY BY THIS DOCUMENT? 
A. YES, I DID FOR UTILITIES AND ROADWAY 
Q. SO YOU AGREE THAT 20 FEET, MR. SCHIMMELPFENNIG HAS 
ACCESS TO YOUR SIDE OF THE PROPERTY. 
A. YES, FOR ROADWAY AND UTILITIES. 
Q. SO HE COULD COME IN THERE TODAY, TAKE OUT YOUR 
IMPROVEMENTS AND PUT A ROADWAY IN? 
A. IF HE'S GOT THE MONEY AND WHEREWITHAL, I GUESS HE CAN. 
Q. SO YOU WOULD AGREE THAT HE COULD HAVE ACCESS TO 
YOUR PROPERTY TO PUT A PAVED ROAD IN. 
A. WELL, IT WOULD BE POINTLESS BECAUSE IT'S ALREADY 
PAVED. 
(Transcript Vol. 2, page 80, lines 7-23.) 
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The testimony of Hart and Fox clearly demonstrate that the parties agreed to a joint 
driveway that would be equally upon the property of each party. The fact that the 
driveway did not end up equally on Hart's property was because of the rush to install the 
driveway in order to beat the winter weather. There was never an agreement between the 
parties that the driveway would be substantially on the property of Schimmelpfennig. 
It is also clear from the testimony that no written easement was ever created for a 
driveway over the Schimmelpfennig property. When Schimmelpfennig purchased the 
property from Fox, he was told by Fox that Hart did not have an easement to build a 
driveway on Schimmelpfennig's property. (Transcript, Vol. 2, page 44.) Fox told 
Schimmelpfennig that the road should have been equally on Hart's property with ten feet 
each party's property. (Transcript, Vol. 1, page 57, line 13 through page 58, line 17.) 
Schimmelpfennig checked with the city and county and could not find any 
evidence of a recorded right-of-way. (Transcript, Vol. 2, page 7, lines 11-15.) After he 
purchased the property, Schimmelpfennig contemplated terminating Hart's right to use 
the driveway on Schimmelpfennig's property. When he mentioned that to Hart, Hart 
threatened to tear up the sewer line. (Transcript, Vol. 2, page 8, line 20 through page 9, 
line 20.) Schimmelpfennig did not pursue the issue any further because he had been 
advised by his father, who was then alive, that he should be a good neighbor and not 
pursue the matter. 
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Schimmelpfennig's position is that the evidence is uncontroverted that no written 
express easement was ever created by the parties. The subdivision plat was not a written 
express easement. It was not signed by the parties and the 40-foot strip of land was 
designated as "Proposed 40-foot wide utility easement and access road." The plat uses 
the word "proposed." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines the word "proposal" 
as "an act of putting forward or stating something for consideration, something proposed, 
suggestion." Black's Law Dictionary 5th Ed., defines "proposal" as "The initial overture 
or preliminary statement for consideration by the other party to a proposed agreement. As 
so used, it is not an offer but it contemplates an offer and hence, its acceptance does not 
ripen into a contract." Clearly the plat with an area which states proposed access road 
does not create an express easement. Clearly, the subdivision plat does not meet the 
requirements for creating an express easement as set forth by this Court in the case of 
Green v. Starts field, supra. 
Green v. Stansfield states that the conveyance of an easement requires 
consideration. There was no evidence presented in the Trial Court that Hart gave any 
consideration for the use of an easement over Schimmelpfennig's property. The evidence 
was uncontroverted that neither Hart nor Fox were required to pay for the fill or asphalt 
which created the existing driveway. Fox testified that there was no cost for the single-
lane driveway and that the import fill and the asphalt was received free from the paving 
company which Fox worked for. (Transcript, Vol. 1, page 139, line 18 - page 140, line 
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5.) Fox testified that Hart and Fox jointly paid for the utility. As previously indicated, 
the utilities were created by a specific written easement, and therefore is separate from the 
cost of the driveway- Hart did not present any testimony that he had spent any money on 
the creation of the driveway or that he had paid any consideration to Schimmelpfennig for 
the use of Schimmelpfennig's property. As previously indicated, little, if any, of the 
driveway is on Hart's property and therefore it cannot be concluded that 
Schimmelpfennig received consideration by the use of Hart's property. 
Judge Hansen, in his order, cites the case of Evans v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 977 P.2d 553 (Utah Ct.App. 2005) as establishing that an oral agreement 
can suffice to create an express easement when the parties so intend. The court 
incorrectly cited and interpreted the Evans case. In Evans, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari from the Court of Appeals decision. 123 P.3d 432 (Utah 2005). The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision., however, it was clear in the Evans case 
that the easement was identified in a deed. 
In Evans, R.L. Bird Company quit-claimed its interest in a portion of property to 
Utah County and reserved an easement and right-of-way over the property. The deed 
contained a specific reservation of right-of-way. The issue in the Evans case was not the 
creation of an express easement but that the deed created a "floating" or "roving" 
easement. The County had contended that the deed did not adequately locate the 
easement and therefore the easement was unenforceable. The court concluded that based 
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upon the language of the deed, it could be determined with precision the burden placed on 
the property and that the deed defined all the essential elements of the easement's 
servitude except its location. The court stated, " . . . confronted with evidence, we have an 
obligation to explore whether the deed's failure to identify the location of the easement 
can be remedied without altering in any material way the bargain struck between the 
grantor and the grantee." The court's quoting of Corbin, which was cited by Judge 
Hansen, was directly related to the location of a floating easement and not the creation of 
an easement that had not been reduced to writing, or in this case, placed in the deed. 
Judge Hansen also quoted the case of Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998). 
In that case, the parties owned adjoining property in 1930. The parties created a common 
lane between their properties with 8 feet on either side of the property line making the 
lane approximately 16 feet wide. The court found that the parties had established a 
boundary by acquiescence and that a prescriptive easement for the lane had been created 
by open, continuous and adverse use under a claim of right for a period of twenty years. 
The court also addressed the issue of express easement. The court recognized than an 
agreement to transfer an interest in land falls within the statute of frauds. The court stated 
that a verbal agreement to transfer an interest in land can be taken out of the statute of 
frauds and a party can be estopped from challenging an oral agreement if three 
requirements are met. The court stated, "A court must find (1) that there was such an 
agreement, (2) there has been part or full performance, and (3) that there was reliance 
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thereon." Id. at 1259. The court concluded that the evidence established that the parties 
had an agreement that they would make a common lane which would be used in 
perpetuity. The court found the evidence sufficiently clear that the lane was to be 16 feet 
wide on either side of the property line, that under the agreement, each owner gave the 
other the use of approximately 8 feet of his property as consideration for the bargain to 
create the easements, that the lane had been used continuously since 1940, and therefore 
there was sufficient evidence to remove the oral agreement from the statute of frauds. 
The court's decision in the Orton case is significantly different from the facts and 
the issues before this Court. The property had been used as a lane since 1940. Both 
parties had access and use of the other party's 8 feet of the lane, which established the 
necessary consideration. The court found that the agreement to create the lane with 8 feet 
on each party's property was performed according to its terms. Those facts do not exist in 
this case. The roadway has only been in use since approximately 1995. The roadway is 
not on Hart's side of the property. Hart does not agree that Schimmelpfennig can have 
access to the 10 feet of the proposed access road which is located on his lot. There is no 
clear evidence that there was an agreement between the parties and even if the agreement 
did exist, the agreement was not performed in accordance with its terms which anticipated 
that the road would be located 10 feet on Hart's property and 10 feet on 
Schimmelpfennig's property. 
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Consequently, there is not sufficient evidence to remove an oral agreement, if there 
is one, from the statute of frauds. An agreement requires the mutual consent and 
understanding of both Hart and Fox. It requires a meeting of the minds. Hart called Fox 
as a witness to support his case. Fox testified that there was no agreement that the road 
would be located primarily on his property, or that Hart could make other uses of the 10-
foot strip of property on his property, which was intended for the road. Hart also testified 
that the agreement contemplated that Schimmelpfennig would have access for purposes 
of the road on ten feet of his property. If there was an agreement, it was that the roadway 
would be equally on Hart's and Fox's property. The agreement, if there was one, was not 
performed according to its terms. There is no oral agreement establishing an express 
easement. 
B. 
IMPLIED EASEMENT 
To possess an implied easement, the Plaintiff must meet four elements. The 
essential elements to a claim for an implied easement are, "1) unity of title followed by 
severance; 2) at the time of the severance the servitude was apparent, obvious, and 
visible; 3) the easement is reasonably necessary to enjoy the dominant estate; and, 4) use 
of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic." Potter v. Chadaz, 1977 P.2d 533, 
538. Emphasis added. See also Butler v. Lee, 114 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corp, 555 P.2d 277 (Utah 1976). Hart did 
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not assert specific facts which would support his argument. Hart did not meet all four 
elements required for an implied easement. 
1. There Was No Unity Of Title Followed By Severance. 
Hart has not alleged any facts in his Complaint and pleadings which support the 
first requirement for an implied easement. Hart cannot show that there was a unity of title 
in Lot 1 and Lot 2 which was followed by severance. 
Hart and previous owners of Lot 2 did not jointly own the two lots. The lots were 
separately owned properties and were not unified. Before Hart and Fox owned the 
parcels, they were owned by Jeff and Tracy Hansen, not as two distinct parcels, but as 
four separate parcels. The Hansens combined parcels numbered 08-076-0030, 0031, 
0063, and 0064 together to create Lot 1 (08-076-0071) and Lot 2 (08-076-0070). Jeff and 
Tracy Hansen obtained ownership of the different parcels from various individuals and 
entities, including Lola Allen, Trustee of the Lola H. Allen Family Trust and Leon Brown 
Floral Company. As such, Jeff and Tracy Hansen held the properties separate and distinct 
from the others. When Hart and Fox submitted their subdivision plans to the city, the lots 
were created by combining four separate and distinct parcels, previously divided and 
individually owned. See Defendant's Exhibit 9, Approved Subdivision Plat A time line 
of events showing the dates of the various deeds and the owners thereof, along with 
copies of the deeds, are shown in Defendant's Exhibit 2. 
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Dave Petersen, the Farmington City Planner, testified that Farmington City would 
not allow any construction, by either Hart or by Fox, until each lot had been individually 
described and acquired. Consequently, the independent ownership of Lot 1 by Hart and 
Lot 2 by Fox was required before any improvement could be done and before a building 
permit could be issued for those improvements. (Transcript Vol. 2, page 67-70.) Both 
parties acquired the title to their properties on April 8, 1994. There was no unity of title 
in Hart or Fox followed by severance. 
2. There Was No Severance of Title, But Assuming There Was A 
Severance, No Servitude Existed. 
No road or driveway existed on the parcels until after Hart (Lot 1) and Fox (Lot 2) 
purchased the lots from Jeff and Tracy Hansen. It was not until after Farmington City 
approved the subdivision plat on May 31, 1994, that the driveway was installed. A dirt 
road was created for the benefit of the home builders. It was not until months after 
Farmington City approved the subdivision plat that the driveway was installed. Even if 
there had been a severance of title, the law requires that the easement must exist at the 
time of the severance. Potter at 538. It is clear that this requirement has not been met. 
If a severance of title took place at the time the properties were being developed, 
no servitude existed. As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, a servitude is "a charge or 
burden resting upon one estate for the benefit or advantage of another." Black's Law 
Dictionary, (5th ed., 1979). At the time Fox acquired Lot 2, Fox was under no obligation 
to provide an access road easement to Hart. The mere fact that Fox gave his permission 
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for Hart to use the driveway or that Schimmelpfennig allowed the same, does not 
establish a burden by right. 
A review of the subdivision plat approved by Farmington City clearly shows that 
there are no easements in place. No road or driveway was in place when Hart submitted 
the subdivision plat to Farmington City. With no driveway in place, no servitude exists. 
With no servitude in existence, the Hart fails to meet the second requirement for an 
implied easement. 
Hart attempted to meet this requirement by stating that a trail existed on the 
property before Hart and Fox acquired Lot 1 and Lot 2, which led to a creek that traveled 
through the rear of Hansen's property. Hart testified that before acquiring his lot, he had 
permission from Hansen to place a fence in the back of Hansen's property by the creek so 
that he could keep his horses, and that the trail was used to access the horses. Hart stated: 
A. YES, THERE WAS. THERE WAS -- THERE WAS KIND OF A TRAIL 
THAT WAS ALREADY LEADING BACK TO THE CREEK. AND 
THAT TRAIL SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME PART OF THE ROAD 
BECAUSE WHEN I SOLD MY HOUSE, I HAD TO GET PERMISSION 
FROM JEFF TO GO AHEAD AND FENCE IT OFF, A PART OF THAT 
PROPERTY, BECAUSE I TOOK ALL MY HORSES OVER THERE AT 
THAT PARTICULAR TIME AND I PUT 'EM IN THE BACK, SO I DID 
FENCE OFF A PIECE IN THE BACK AND PUT MY HORSES BACK 
THERE AND THAT WAS MY -- MY TRAIL WAS -- ACTUALLY 
BECAME THE ROAD THAT GOES BACK THERE NOW. 
Q. WHEN WAS THIS TIME FRAME WHEN YOU PUT YOUR FENCE --
YOUR HORSES ON THE PROPERTY? 
A. IT WOULD HAVE BE IN MARCH. 
Q. IN MARCH OF '94? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. BEFORE YOU OWNED THE PROPERTY? 
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A. BEFORE I OWNED THE PROPERTY. 
Q. YOU PUT FENCES -- YOU PUT - YOU PUT FENCES -
A. JUST PUT A LITTLE BIT OF FENCE IN THE BACK TO KEEP MY 
HORSES BACK THERE FOR -- BY THE CREEK SO WE COULD 
KEEP THEM BECAUSE MY WIFE AND I HAD TO RENT AN 
APARTMENT AT THAT TIME BECAUSE WE'D SOLD OUR HOUSE. 
Q. AND HOW DID YOU GET THE HORSES BACK THERE? 
A. JUST DROVE DOWN THE MIDDLE OF THE PROPERTY, AND 
THERE'S KIND OF A TRAIL THAT WAS ALREADY THERE. WE 
JUST DROVE DOWN THAT TRAIL AND THAT'S KIND OF WHAT 
WE USED FOR THE ACCESS ROAD. 
Q. AND THE LOCATION OF THAT, CAN YOU SHOW WHERE THAT 
IS? 
A. IT PRETTY WELL FOLLOWS EXACTLY WHERE WE'RE - WHERE 
THE ROAD ENDED UP. I MEAN IT'S IRONIC (emphasis added), BUT 
THAT'S PRETTY WELL WHERE THE ROAD ENDED UP WAS RIGHT 
DOWN THE MIDDLE OF THE PROPOSED 40-FOOT EASEMENT 
THAT RATHMAN HAD PUT ON THERE. 
(Transcript Vol. 1, page 54, line 5 through page 55, line 10.) 
After Hart acquired Lot 1 and Fox acquired Lot 2, they were required to locate 
their home sites in the middle of the lots. The location of the homes dictated where the 
access to the homes would be placed. Fox testified at the time he bought his lot there was 
no existing road to either one of the lots or homes. He stated that after the fill had been 
hauled in for the footings for the homes, that a strip was built up for the road, which was 
situated down the middle of the property lines. (Transcript, Vol. 1, page 149, lines 7-25.) 
Fox also stated: 
Q. WHAT DICTATED WHERE YOU PUT THE HOUSE PADS? 
A. THE PLAT, THE WAY IT WAS APPROVED BY THE CITY. 
Q. SO WHERE THEY HAD TO BE LOCATED ON THE LOTS IN ORDER 
TO MEET THE SETBACK AND THE OFFSETS, THAT TYPE OF 
THING? 
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A. NO, I DON'T THINK IT WAS THE SETBACK OR OFFSETS. I MEAN 
MAYBE THE OFFSETS ON THE SIDE PROPERTY LINES, BUT NOT 
THE SETBACK OFF OF 1100 WEST. 
Q. THE FILL YOU PUT IN, YOU'D GET ACCESS TO THE PADS, BUT 
DICTATED BY WHERE YOU PUT THE HOUSE PADS; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. YEAH, FOR A SINGLE DRIVEWAY COMING INTO BOTH HOMES 
IN THE SOMEWHAT MIDDLE OF THE HOMES, YEAH. 
Q. SO WHERE YOU PUT THE FILL IN TO GET TO THE H OMES HAD 
NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PATH THAT MAY HAVE BEEN 
THERE BEFORE, DID IT? 
A. NOT REALLY, NOT IN MY EYES. 
Q. SO THE PATH DIDN'T DICTATE WHERE IT WENT. 
A. NO. 
Q. HAD NO BEARING UPON WHERE YOU PUT THE PADS FOR THE 
HOUSE OR WHERE YOU PUT THE DIRT TO GET TO THE HOUSES; 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. WELL, THAT'S KIND OF A CATCH QUESTION TO ME. I MEAN WE -
- WE SET UP OUR HOMES SO THE GARAGES WERE ON THE 
INNER PART SO ONE LANE WOULD COME IN. SO OBVIOUSLY, 
THAT WAS THE PLACE TO PUT THE ENTRY. 
Q. AND WHEN THE PLAT WAS PREPARED THAT SHOWS THE 40-
FOOT EASEMENT -
A. RIGHT. 
Q. - PROPOSED AS ACCESS, THAT WAS DONE BY AN ENGINEER 
WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO WHAT'S ON THE LAND, WASN'T 
IT? 
A. WHAT'S ON THE EXISTING LAND? 
Q. YEAH. 
A. YEAH. 
Q. SO IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE 40-FOOT EASEMENT, HAD 
NOTHING TO DO WITH WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A TRAIL 
ON THE PROPERTY BEFORE, DID IT? 
A. NO. HAD TO DO WITH WHERE WE WANTED TO PLACE THE 
HOMES. 
(Transcript Vol. 1, page 166, line 3 through page 167, line 13.) 
Hart did not establish a servitude. 
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3. The Driveway Is Not Reasonably Necessary For Hart To Enjoy His Property. 
Hart cannot show that the use of the driveway on Schimmelpfennig's property is 
reasonably necessary for Hart to enjoy his property. Hart's property is not landlocked, 
and is accessible other than by the use of Schimelpfennig's driveway. Hart's western 
boundary line touches 1100 West, a Farmington public street, for approximately 120 feet. 
Hart installed a concrete pad from his garage to the rear of his property that was 20 feet 
wide and 100 feet long. While being asked about this concrete pad, Hart stated: 
Q. ALL RIGHT. SO YOU'RE SAYING THAT THAT CONCRETE PAD IS 
ABOUT 20 FEET WIDE, AND IT'S ABOUT FOUR FOOT OFF YOUR 
FENCE LINE, OFF YOUR PROPERTY LINE. 
A. YES. 
Q. SO ABOUT 24 FOOT TO 24 FOOT, THAT PAD IS, THAT WOULD 
IT WITH A FOUR-FOOT OFFSET DIRECTLY IN LINE WITH THE 
PROPOSED ROAD ACCESS, THE 20 FEET ON YOUR SIDE OF THE 
LINE, WOULDN'T IT? 
Q. WELL, YOU KNOW HOW CLOSE THAT PAD IS TO YOUR 
PROPERTY 
A. YEAH, PRETTY CLOSE. 
Q. AND THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NOTHING OBSTRUCTING YOUR 
VIEW TO THE ROAD EXCEPT FOR THE FENCE AND THE TREES 
THAT YOU PUT IN; 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. NOW, IF YOU LOOK AT YOUR HOME, AND IT'S NOT QUITE AS 
CLEAR HERE, YOUR DRIVEWAY -- EXCUSE ME, YOUR CARPORT 
IS FURTHER TO THE NORTH, SO IT'S MORE THAN 24 FEET TO 
THE BEGINNING OF YOUR CARPORT, ISN'T IT? YOUR CARPORT 
FACES DIRECTLY TOWARDS THE STREET, DOES IT NOT? 
A. YES, CARPORT DOES. 
Q. SO IF YOU PUT A ROAD IN DIRECTLY FROM THE FRONT OF 
YOUR PROPERTY INTO YOUR GARAGE, YOU WOULDN'T EVEN 
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TOUCH THE TREES ON THE RIGHT-HAND SIDE; ISN'T THAT 
RIGHT? 
A. PROBABLY NOT. 
Q. SO YOU COULD PUT A STRAIGHT SHOT IN TO YOUR GARAGE, 
CORRECT? 
A YEAH, PROBABLY COULD. 
Q. THERE'S NOTHING KEEPING YOU FROM DOING THAT. YOU CAN 
PUT SOME ROAD BASE THERE AND YOU'D BE OKAY, RIGHT? 
A. WELL, THAT'S YOUR INTERPRETATION. I DON'T THINK I'D BE 
ALL RIGHT, BUT YEAH. 
(Transcript Vol. 1, page 89, line 18 through page 90, line 22.) 
Hart contended that a retention pond which was on the front of his property might 
interfere with a road from the city road to his garage. However, Hart acknowledged when 
he was shown a copy of a letter from Farmington City Planning Commission that there 
was no requirement for the size nor the location of the retention pond and that it could be 
placed anywhere on his property. (Transcript Vol. 1, page 98-99, line 5.) Defendant's 
Exhibit 5, photographs 1 and 2 show that Hart has a straight line of access from the 
Farmington public road to his garage and the concrete pad which he has constructed from 
his garage toward the rear of his property. Nothing interferes with that line of access 
except for some trees and the retention pond. Hart testified that he could put a driveway 
in without having to remove his trees. Hart has access to the rear of his property by use 
of the 20-foot by 100-foot concrete pad. Hart stated: 
Q. NOW, LOOKING AT PAGE 2, YOU COULD ACCESS THE BACK OF 
YOUR PROPERTY BY THE CONCRETE PAD THAT YOU HAVE 
THAT'S 20 FOOT WIDE AND A HUNDRED FOOT LONG, COULD 
YOU NOT? 
A. YOU KNOW, I PROBABLY COULD. 
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Q. MATTER OF FACT, YOU PARK HEAVY EQUIPMENT THERE 
SOMETIMES, DON'T YOU? 
A. NO, NEVER DO. MOTOR HOME'S AS BIG AS IT EVER GETS 
PARKED OVER THERE, SIR. 
Q. YOU DRIVE YOUR MOTOR HOME IN THERE AND YOU GO BACK 
AND YOU WORK ON IT? 
A. WE JUST, YEAH, WINTERIZE IT, WHATEVER. 
Q. AND YOU HAVE A GATE THERE THAT YOU CAN OPEN UP TO 
HAVE COMPLETE ACCESS TO THAT PAD. 
A. YES, I DO. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU COULD ACCESS THE FRONT OF THAT PAD 
FROM YOUR DRIVEWAY ON YOUR PROPERTY, RIGHT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND THERE'S NO REASON YOU CAN'T ACCESS ALL THE REST OF 
YOUR PROPERTY TO THE BACK WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FACT 
THAT YOU BUILT A SHOP BACK THERE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. NOW, YOU COULD TURN SLIGHTLY, GO RIGHT PAST THE SHOP 
AND GET INTO YOUR BACKYARD, COULDN'T YOU? 
A. YEAH, WITHOUT A DOUBT, YOU PROBABLY COULD. 
Q. SO THERE'S NOTHING KEEPING YOU FROM ACCESSING YOUR 
GARAGE OR THE REAR OF YOUR PROPERTY ON YOUR 
PROPERTY, IS THERE? 
A. NO. 
(Transcript, Vol. 1, page 92, line 10 through 93, line 12.) 
It is clear from the photographs and the testimony of Hart that the use of 
Schimmelpfennig's driveway is not necessary for Hart to enjoy the use of his property, 
either for access to his garage or access to the rear of his property. This lawsuit was 
initiated when Schimmelpfennig attempted to place a fence from his house, across the 
paved portion of the property which would eliminate Hart from being able to travel over 
the paved and graveled road from Schimmelpfennig's house to the rear of his property 
where Hart has a gate by which he accesses the rear of his property. The evidence is clear 
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that Hart does not need to use Schimmelpfennig's driveway to access the rear of his 
property. Therefore, Hart fails to meet the third requirement for an implied easement. 
4. Hart Has Used the Defendants' Driveway, However Said Use Was by 
Permission Rather Than By Right. 
Fox and Schimmelpfennig admit that Hart has used the driveway on 
Schimmelpfennig's property in the past. However, the use of the driveway was by the 
permission of Fox and Schimmelpfennig. The testimony of Fox and Schimmelpfennig to 
the permissive use has bee previously set forth in this brief. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, Hart's attorney asked the court to allow a theory 
of easement by trespass to be argued. That issue had not been raised in the pleadings. 
Judge Hansen, in explaining why he felt the theory was not appropriate, concluded that 
Hart's use of the driveway had been by permission. 
THE COURT: 
WELL, I WILL, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, LET ME 
INDICATE TO YOU, THESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN USING 
THIS RIGHT OF WAY NOW FROM 1994 - I SAY THESE 
PEOPLE, THAT INCLUDES FOXES -- TO 2007. MUTUALLY 
USING IT. IF YOU GOT PERMISSION, WHERE'S THE 
TRESPASS? IF YOU GIVE ME PERMISSION TO COME INTO 
YOUR HOME, I'M NOT TRESPASSING CIVILLY OR 
CRIMINALLY. THESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DRIVING UP 
AND DOWN THIS DRIVEWAY FOR 13 YEARS, INCLUDING 
THE FOXES, NOT THE SCHIMMELPFENNIGS. FOR THEM 
IT'S MORE LIKE NINE OR EIGHT. SO.I'VE HEARD YOUR 
ARGUMENT ABOUT TRESPASS AND I'VE READ THAT 
CASE, BUT I CAN'T GET OVER THE HURDLE THAT IT'S 
PERMISSIVE. I MEAN IN THIS CASE, I KNOW THESE 
PEOPLE OBJECT TO OWNERSHIP, AND UP UNTIL THE 
INJUNCTION, NO STEPS WERE TAKEN TO SAY NO. AND 
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THEN I MADE MY RULING ON THE INJUNCTION AND LET 
THE HARTS CONTINUE TO USE IT. NOW, SO I DON'T SEE 
THE WENDY'S CASE AS BEING HEAVILY INFLUENTIAL IN 
MY DECISION IN THIS CASE. 
(Transcript Vol. 2, page 96, line 18 through page 97, line 9.) 
The first three requirements for establishing an implied easement have not been 
established by Hart. All four requirements must be established in order for the doctrine of 
implied easement to apply. The court committed an error of law in concluding that Hart had an 
implied easement to use the driveway on Schimmelpfennig's driveway. 
C. 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF HART 
Utah law does not require a party to marshal evidence in favor of the opposing party 
when the issue is an error in law. It is not clear what duty there is to marshal evidence under a 
mixed question of law and fact as described in State of Utah v. Levin, supra. 
Hart asserted during the trial that the parties had a mutual agreement to install a joint 
driveway which was evidenced by the subdivision plat. He asserted that that agreement was 
evidenced by the paved road that was put in and had been in place since the homes were built. 
Hart also attempted to fulfill the requirements of an implied easement by testifying that there was 
a trail that existed on the property before it was purchased by Hart and Fox which led from the 
public road toward the rear of the property that was owned by the Hansen's. The trail led to a 
stream at the rear of the property. Hart had been permitted to keep horses on the property prior to 
the property being subdivided and conveyed to Hart and Fox. 
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The existence of the trail would only be significant if it fulfilled the requirements of an 
implied easement. The evidence was clear that the proposed right-of-way and access road was 
created by the engineer in order to be located on the property line of Hart and Fox and between 
the homes of Hart and Fox. There was no evidence that the location of the homes was influenced 
at all by a trail that existed on the property before the property was subdivided. Hart claimed that 
the trail was substantially in the location in the proposed right-of-way. Hart, in commenting on 
the location of the trail and the proposed right-of-way, stated that it was pretty well where the 
road ended up "I mean it's ironic..." (Transcript Vol. 1, page 55, lines 7-10.) Fox testified that 
the trail had nothing to do with the intended location of the joint driveway. As discussed under 
Point B of this argument, the existence and location of the trail does not and can not satisfy the 
requirements of an easement by implication. 
As to the agreement for the location of the common driveway, Hart testified, when asked 
if the driveway was to be located partially on his property, that he didn't know what the 
agreement was or if there was an agreement. (Transcript Vol. 1, page 88, lines 10-21.) 
In relationship to the issue of whether or not the use of Schimmelpfennig's land for the 
right-of-way was necessary, Hart testified that he had installed improvements on his property that 
consisted of a fence and trees. Hart did not present any testimony as to the cost of removing the 
trees for the purpose of the roadway. Hart did testify that he could have access directly to his 
garage without having to remove the trees. (Transcript, Vol. 1, page 90, lines 6-22.) Hart 
testified that the most convenient access for him to access the 
back of his property was across the driveway that was located on Schimmelpfennig's property. 
However, he also testified that he could access his property by the 20-foot by 100-foot concrete 
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strip that ran from his garage toward the rear of his property. (Transcript, Vol. 1, page 92, line 10 
through page 93, line 12.) 
Hart did not present any testimony during the course of the trial asserting that he had paid 
any consideration for the easement on Fox or Schimmelpfennig's property. The consideration, if 
any, would have to be the mutual use of each other's property of each other's property for 
purposes of the driveway. Very little of the driveway is located on Hart's property, and it is not 
necessary for Schimmelpfennig to access his property. Hart prohibited ten feet on his side of the 
property line from being used as a driveway by installing a fence and trees in the front of his 
home and a 6-foot fence at the rear of his home. Fox testified that the installation of the fence 
was not with his knowledge or consent. 
The evidence presented by Hart, through his testimony and the testimony of Fox, when 
viewed most favorably to Hart does not support the existence of an express easement or easement 
by implication. 
CONCLUSION 
Hart claims the right to use the driveway that is located on Schimmelpfennig's property. 
In order to establish that right-of-way he has to demonstrate that he has an express easement or 
easement by implication. Hart did not establish that there was a written document creating an 
express easement, or that any consideration was given by Hart for an easement on 
Schimmelpfennig's property. Utah law requires that Hart meet both of these requirements to 
have an express easement. If the court were to determine that an express easement could be 
created by an agreement that did not meet the requirements of prescriptive easement, Hart would 
still have to establish that there was an agreement between the parties and that he had complied 
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with the agreement for a significant period of time. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Hart 
did not comply with the alleged agreement. He constructed improvements on his side of the 
property line that prohibited his property from being used for a common driveway. 
Hart does not have an easement by implication. There was no unity of title followed by a 
severance, there was no servitude at the time of severance and the alleged easement was not 
necessary for Hart to enjoy his estate. Hart had access to the front and the rear of his property 
without having to make any significant changes to his property. Hart had access over the ten feet 
of his property immediately joining the property line by removing a fence and some trees. No 
evidence was presented by Hart as to why he could not remove the trees or the cost if he did 
move the trees. Hart did not satisfy the requirements for obtaining an implied easement over 
Schimmelpfennig's property. 
Judge Hansen committed an error in law in concluding that Hart had an express and an 
implied easement. Judge Hansen's decision should be reversed and this Court 
should rule that Hart does not have an easement over Schimmelpfennig's property and 
Schimmelpfennig cannot be restricted in the use of his property. 
/ . _ — 
Dated this ^ day oic_j CJAf^ , 2008. 
/p 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
T.R. MORGAN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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1. Plaintiffs Hart and the Foxes jointly subdivided and developed lots 1 and 2 
between March and December 1994. 
2. Plaintiffs and the Foxes agreed to a 40' easement which would run between the 
two lots. Additionally, they agreed that certain utility lines would run along the easement and be 
shared by the two lots. These lines were jointly ordered and paid for by Plaintiffs and the Foxes. 
Defendants admit that the two lots share utility lines but allege that the entire 40f easement was 
envisioned as a utility easement, 
3. The utility easement was noted on a plat map and a deed was recorded for it. No 
deed was recorded for a driveway easement because one was not requested by Davis County. 
Indeed, it was the testimony of a Davis County official that the county would not accept a deed 
for a driveway easement, 
4. In May 1994, Plaintiffs and Foxes installed an approximately 12f wide driveway 
that runs along the easement. Plaintiffs concede that the driveway does not take up the entire 
easement, but note that the actual location of the driveway was jointly chosen for aesthetic and 
other reasons. Tom Fox testified at trial that the parties intended a common driveway for the two 
lots at the outset of the subdivision, 
5. Tom Fox testified at trial that he installed the driveway himself. Although he 
intended to center the driveway upon the property line, he was in a hurry to install the driveway 
and he did not measure. There was a meeting of the minds between the Foxes and Plaintiffs that: 
(1) the homes share a common driveway; and (2) the driveway be where the current driveway is. 
6. The location of the driveway substantially corresponds to the location of an access 
road already on the property when it was purchased by Plaintiffs and the Foxes. 
7. Plaintiffs and Foxes jointly maintained and enjoyed the driveway and joint lines 
until the Foxes sold lot 2 to Defendants in March 1999. 
8. Plaintiffs and Defendants jointly maintained and enjoyed the driveway and lines 
until 2005, when Defendants demanded that Plaintiffs no longer use the driveway. 
9. Plaintiffs have improved their side of the driveway with fencing, berms, trees, and 
other landscaping. 
10. Defendants dug a trench and placed a horse trailer to imped Plaintiffs' access to 
the rear part of the property through the driveway. This behavior was enjoined as part of the 
instant action. 
EXPRESS EASEMENT 
A valid express easement was created by Plaintiffs and the Foxes when they agreed 
to develop their respective lots in such a way as to use a common driveway. Although there are 
no specific requirements for the creation of an express easement, Utah Courts generally look to 
the intent of the parties to an agreement purportedly transferring real property to determine 
whether the document describes the interest granted "in a manner sufficient to construe the 
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instruments as a conveyance of an interest in land." Potter v. Chadaz, 911 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 
Ct. App, 1999). Not only are there no specific requirements for the creation of an express 
easement, but even an oral agreement can suffice to create an express easement where the parties 
so intended. See Orton v. Carter^ 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998). As the Utah Court of Appeals 
made clear in Evans, 
"If the parties have concluded a transaction in which it appears that they intend to 
make a contract, the court should not frustrate their intention if it is possible to reach 
a fair and just result, even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings 
and the filling of some gaps..." 
"...language fixing the location of an easement is not always necessary when other 
terms of the easement safeguard the servient estate from the risk that its burden may 
be greater than that for which it bargained/' 
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 977 P.2d 533 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
Here, it is clear that Plaintiffs and the Foxes intended to build a common driveway. 
Indeed, Tom Fox, a man who professes no interest in the outcome of this litigation, admits that 
this is the agreement he reached with Donald Hart. To now undo the agreement of the parties 
would be to frustrate their freedom to contract with one another about how they will jointly use 
their respective property. 
Defendants essentially make three arguments against the validity of the easement 
contemplated by their predecessors in interest: (1) that the easement must be created by deed; (2) 
that the agreement lacks consideration; and (3) if the Court finds that an easement was created, 
that it must take up the entire 40* utility easement. All three of these arguments fall short of the 
mark. The first argument, that the easement must be created by deed, is clearly at odds with the 
authorities cited above. The second argument, that the agreement lacks consideration, is 
erroneous on its face. Indeed, the mutual agreement between the parties sufficed as 
consideration. Finally, to accept the contention that the mutual driveway must be of the same 
dimensions as the utility easement would be to frustrate the very freedom to contract that the 
parties exercised when installing the driveway. As stated by Tom Fox and Plaintiffs, the parties 
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$ intended a common driveway and common utilities to save money on the installation of these 
• • 
* items. To now find that the parties were required at the time to install a 40' wide driveway -
•* more than three times the width of the driveway now in place - would be to negate any savings 
3 that the parties enjoyed as a result of their agreement. 
2 For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that a valid easement was created by 
2} Foxes and Plaintiffs, and that Defendants purchased their home with actual knowledge of its 
condition. See Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Defendants are hereby 
enjoined from any obstruction of the common driveway. 
IMPLIED EASEMENT 
In the alternative, the Plaintiffs and Foxes created a valid easement by implication. 
There are four elements necessary to constitute an easement by implication: (t) unity of title 
followed by severance; (2) at the time of the severance the servitude was apparent, obvious, and 
visible; (3) the easement was reasonably necessary to enjoy the dominant estate; and (4) use of 
the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. See Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150,1152 (Utah 
Ct App. 1989). 
All four elements from Butler have been met 
1. Unity of title followed by severance. The two lots at issue existed as one piece 
of land owned by Hansen and then were divided by the parties according to their own terms. 
Defendant's own Exhibit 2 demonstrates that there was a unity of title of the property as a whole 
in 1990. Hansen then severed the single piece of property he owned by conveying to Plaintiffs 
and Foxes on April 18, 1994. 
2. Apparent, obvious, and visible. The witnesses at trial noted that a road (or 4-
wheel drive trail, as some have called it) existed down the approximate center of the property. 
This road was used extensively by the parties before construction and sat in essentially the same 
place as the common driveway sits today. On the date of the severance discussed above, 
Plaintiffs and Foxes were already using the road for their horses and both agreed that it was 
apparent, obvious, and visible. 
3. Reasonable necessity. At all times relevant to this litigation, the common 
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driveway and the road that preceded it were reasonably necessaiy to enjoy the dominant estate 
because in either form, the road has been the only access to the rear of the dominant estate. 
Defendants point out that Plaintiffs could access their driveway by altering the front of their 
property to remove a retention pond required for the development of their property. It would be 
inequitable and indeed unreasonable to deny Plaintiff the benefit of a bargain struck over 10 
years ago and require costly landscaping work. 
Defendants claim that, because Plaintiff works for a paving company, he could install 
a new driveway at a discount. While this contention may technically be true, it ignores the fact 
that an easement by implication must be reasonably necessary, not absolutely necessary. Were 
Plaintiffs to install another driveway, they would have to do a great deal of re-landscaping in 
connection with moving the retention pond. 
4. Continuous use. Defendants concede that Plaintiffs'use of the driveway 
easement has been continuous. 
For the reasons above, Plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment in favor of the 
creation of an easement is granted. Defendants are hereby enjoined from any obstruction of the 
common driveway. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Utah adheres to the well-established rule that attorney's fees generally cannot be 
recovered unless provided for by statute or contract. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 
414, 419 (Utah 1989). The only statute cited by the parties which would allow for the recovery 
of attorney's fees is Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, which would grant an award of attorney's fees 
if Plaintiffs had brought this action in bad faith or if Defendants had asserted a defense in bad 
faith. Neither scenario is present here. Accordingly, no fees will be awarded in this matter. 
ORDER 
It is hereby ordered: 
(1) The Court affirms the legality of the shared driveway in its present location. 
(2) The Preliminary Injunction is now made permanent and shall not be disturbed. 
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(3) Plaintiffs are awarded their costs. No fees shall be awarded. 
DATED December ^ 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
l. Darwm C. Hansen 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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TIME LINE AND DEED SUMMARY 
Lot Maintiffs' Property Lot 2 - Defendants' Property 
August 1,1989 
Leon Brown Floral Company WD to 
Jeffrey and Tracy Hansen 4 acres 
08-076-0031 
August 22,1985 
John White & Carol White WD to Lola Allen, 1 
acre Parcel 08-076-0030 
March 17,1988 
Lola Allen QCD to Lola Allen, Trustee 1 acre 
Parcel 08-076-0030 
October 9,1990 
Lola Allen, Trustee WD to Jeffery and 
Tracy Hansen 1 acre 08-076-0300 
April 18,1994 
Jeffery and Tracy Hansen WD to Donald 
and Cindy Hart 4.0580 acres 08-076-0031, 
0063, 0064 
April 18,1994 
Jeffery and Tracy Hansen WD to Tom and 
Lori Fox 2.0179 acres 08-076-0030, 0031 
May 13,1994 
Donald and Cindy Hart execute Grant of 
Easement to Farmington City re: utilities 
May 13,1994 
Tom and Lori Fox execute Grant of 
Easement to Farmington City re: utilities 
May 24,1994 
Donald and Cindy Hart execute Grant of 
Easement to Farmington City, re: Trail 
May 31,1994 
Final Approval by Farmington City of 
Minor Subdivision 
Farmington City issues Building Permit 
allowing construction on Lot 1 to begin 
on June 1, 1994. 
Farmington City issues Building Permit 
allowing construction on Lot 2 to begin 
on June 1,1994 
March 12,1999 
Tom and Lori Fox WD to Glen and Karen 
Schimmelpfennig 2.0179 acres 
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feet; thence South 89 degrees 47*00" Weat 377.96 feet to the point of beginning of 
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WARRANTY DEED 0 0 3 I >> 
^ J E F F R E Y MT HANSEN and TRACY N. HANSEN, aka TRACY HANSEN, husband and wife. 
grantor(s), of DAVIS eounty. hanjby CONVEY and WARRANT to 
THOMAS E. FOX, JR. and LORl T. FOX, huaband and wife, as Joint tenants 
grantao of SALT LAKE county, tor tha> sum of Ton dollars and othar good and vahabia conaWaration. thai tallowing 
dsaertbad met of land to Oavfs County. Stata of Utah, to*He 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A* 
Subject to covenants, conditions and restrictions of record. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. Grantor has haraunto cat grantor's hand and saat this 
I * ™ day of Ap,. I , 1994. / 
HANSEN 1 5  / . 
COUNTY OF Oavis 
STATE OF Utah 
1 
J 
Tho torogohg htbwnant was ackncwtoogad tVoro mt on this i%tK day of 
Ap>. I , 1994. by JEFFREY M. HANSEN and TRACY N. HANSEN, aka TRACY 
HANSEN, 
C^f'/tS 
Notary Public 
— j 
Z l i 1 1 9 5 3 B V74S ? 12A2 
Onte-Numb*: 14490 
Beginning at a point South 89 degrees 55*05* West 19.14 feet end North 0 degrees 02*06* 
West 357.70 feet from the Southwest corner of Section 24, Township 3 North, Range 1 
West, Sett Uke BSM end Meridian (Basis of Soaring being North 00 degrees 07*49* West 
measured along the west line of said See. 24 per Davis Co. Reference Plat), and running 
thence along the East tins of 1100 West Street, North 0 degrees 02*06* West 118.00 feet; 
thence North 89 degrees 47*00* East 377.96 feet; thence South 0 degrees 02*05* Eaet 40.00 
feet; North 89 degrees 47*00* East 279.50 feet; thence South 29 degrees 45*34* West 223.09 
feet; thence South 89 degrees 47*00* West 168.64 feet; thence North 0 degrees 02'06* West 
115.25 feet; thence South 89 degrees 47*00* West 377.96 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 2.0179 acres. 
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*s*a -» . v x GRANT OF EASEMENT JSIH^^AJISTRS fSL „,**> *& & 
£7 &S 3 / \ f \ \ 0 WEC'O FOR FARMH6T0H CITY CORP 
For valuable consideration, receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged. Thomas 
E. Fox and Lori T. Fox, husband and wire, and Donald O. Hart and Cindy L. Hart, husband nd wife, 
GRANTORS, hereby grant and convey to Fannington City, a municipal corporation, organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, GRANTEE, an easement to construct, maintain, operate, 
inspect, remove, and/or replace public utilities and related facilities on, over, and across the following 
described property: 
A strip of land 10 feet in width lying to the east of the foltowing described line: 
Beginning at a point South 89*55*05" West 19.14 feet and North 0*02*06" West 357.70 
££ gr feet from the Southwest corner of Section 24, T3N, RIW, SLBM (basis of bearing being 
p s& North 00a0T49" West measured along the west line of said Section 24 per Davis Co. 
eg e s Reference Plat) and running (hence along the East line of 1100 West Street the following 
§ CM three courses: North 0*02*06" West 165.25 feet, thence North 89*47*00" East 2.91 feet, 
*?» a thence North 0QTIT07 East 70.10 feet: and 
isl 
S3 -a /\ strip of land lying 20 feel on either »da of the following described line: J>ti 
Beginning at a point South STCS'tf" West 19.14 feet and North 00"02'06" West 475.70 
feet from the Southwest corner of Section 24, T3N, RIW, SLBM (basis of bearing being 
North 00*07*49" West measured along the west line of said Section 24 per Davis Co. 
Reference Plat), and running thence North 89*47*00" East 377.96 fecL 
Grantor shall not utilize the easement in any manner which will obstruct or interfere with any 
of die facilities therein. 
Ttiis easement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Grantor and Grantee and 
their respective heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns. 
Signed and dated this /#**• day of May, 1994. 
GRANTORS! / * 
Thomas,!! Fox. Jr. Z/t Donald O. Hart 
Lori T. Fox s Cindy L. Hart' 
ACKNOWLFJMEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OPJUiidK ) 
On this /.fff*-, day of May, 1994, personally appeared before me, Thomas £ Fox, Jr., Lori 
T. Fox. Donald 0 . Hart, and Cindy L Hart, the signers of the foregoing instrument who duly 
acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC S « » J 3 taSSSSSHSL I 
Residing in JuZ&County. Utah J t S E f T K 5 S 8 8 " M&BtyU,fcrwe^ii*t«tA* i 
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Tab 5 
GRAPHIC SCALb 
SS MH 
RIM EL-4229 55 
IE - 4220+7 
EOGfc OF EXISTING 
ROAD " " 
SS Mh 
RIM EL -4227 79 
IE - «219 89 
Beginning at a point which Is North 00 07 49" West 528 00 feet 
and North 89 051 ZO" West 15 32 feet from the Southwest corner of 
Section 24 Township 3 North Range 1 West Salt Loke Base and 
Meridian (Basis of Bearing being North 00 07 49" West measured 
along the west line of said Sec 24 per Davis Co Reference Plat 
and running thence along the East Line of 1100 West Street South 
0017 07" West 5 10 feet thence North 89 47 00" East 815 95 
f-et thence South 89 51 30 East 20 40 feet to the West line of 
the DicRGWRR Right-Of-Way thence along said West line North 
34 45 2b" W*st 0 b f»et thence South 89 47 00" West 20 31 
fe»»t thence North 89 5130 West 815 92 feet to the point of 
beginning Containing 0 0477 acres 
Beginning at o point South 89 55 05" West 19 14 feet and 
North 0 02 06" West 475 70 feet from the Southwest corner of 
Section 24 Township 3 North Range 1 West Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian (Basis of Bearing being North 00 07 49" West measured 
along the west line of said Sec 24 per Davis Co Reference Plat) 
ond running thence olong the East Line of 1100 West Street the 
following (3) courses North 0 02 06" West 47 25 feet thence 
North 89 47 00 East 2 91 feet thence Moith 0017 07" East 
70 10 feet thence South 89 5130" East 6 /015 feet thence South 
017 07" West 65 00 feet thence South 89 5130 East 145 77 
feet thence North 89 47 00" East 20 3^ feet to the West line of 
the O&RGWRR Right-Of-Way thence along said West line South 
34 45 26" East 340 52 feet thence South 89 47 00" West 486 53 
feet thence North 29 45 34" East 223 09 feel thence South 
89 47 00" West 279 50 feet thence North 0 02 06" W*>st 40 00 
feet thence South 89 47 00" West 377 96 feet to the point of 
beginning Containing 4 0580 acres 
LOT 2 LEGAL DESCRIPTION (TOM & LORI FOX) 
Beginning at a point South 89 55 05" West 19 14 feet and 
Noith 0 02 06" West 3^7 70 feet from the Southwest corner of 
Section 24 Township 3 North Range I West Salt Lake Base and 
M-ndian (Basi3 of Beorng being North 00 07 49" West rneosured 
olong the west line of said Se .^ 24 per Oovis Co R»ference Plat) 
ond running ther ce along the East Lne o' 1100 West Street North 
0 02 06" West 118 00 feet thence North 89 47 00" Fast 377 96 
feet thence South 0 02 06" »-ost 40 00 feet North 89 47 00" 
Eu«4 279 50 feet thene* South 29 45 S4 West 223 09 feet thence 
South 89 47 00" West 168 64 feet Hence Not it 0 02 06* West 
11*25 feel thence South 89 47 00 We«=t ^77 96 feet to th t point 
of beginnina Ccntamna 2 0179 acres 
Boundary Survey for Dov» Brown 
1031 Easl 250 South 
by The Consortium lne 
David J Bird LS #5661 
Date 7/21/89 
record § 394 
Boundary Survey for Merrill Black 
DWG # 90-133 
HiH Jamison and Associates lne 
Von R Hill LS #5707 
Date 9/11/90 
record #570 
The pirpo«e of fbi's document is to mee» the requirements for a 
mmor subdlvwor in Farmington Uty UT An actual survey was made 
on th«* ground and tied lo the section monuments o shown Property 
corners were efuVr found or set a- shown 
II ie Owed Gap/Overlap shown 
Claimed b/ nil nterested parlies 
i descriptions Is to be Quit-
FINAL APPROVAL 
UNDER PROVISIONS OP THC SUBDIVISION 
ORDINANCES OF FARHUI6T0N, UTAH, 
LOTS SHOWN ON TWO SURVEY MAY BE 
RECORDED AND SOLO C» PJJETES AND 
BOUNDS 
&*A* f*Lt^/C ^ X ^ 7 
DATE ZOf^lQAOMlNlSTHATOR 
Basis of Beat no u**ira North 00 0 / 4 9 " Wf«st measured along the 
west line of s^id Sec 24 per Davis Co Reference Plat The bearing 
from the Southwest corner ol section 24 to the Ruaar Tower i 
Francis Peak was measured as North 4 2 * 8 1 2 " East 
Contours and spot elevat ot«" shown on this drawing are exist ng 
grades per Davrs County Datum Benchmark used was the SW cor Sec 
24 EL-4275 30 pei Davis County Surveyors Tie Sheet 
SURVEYORS CERfiriCATION 
I STEVEN C RATHBUN A REGISTERED LAND SURVEYOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE LAW OF IHE STATE OF UTAH HOLDING UCENCF NO 186290 00 
HERCBY CERTIFY THAT I HA^L M \0E A SURVFY OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED 
PROPERTY AND THAI THIS PLAT IS A TRUF AND CORRECT REPRESENTATION OF 
DAIt STEVEN G RATHBUN P E k L S 
FATHBUN ENGINEERING 
CONSiRUCTION AND LAND SURVEYING PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
CIVIL AND MINING ENGINEERING 
aau sou H <OU EAST SANO* UT B40?O _____ fH JB°lL^zlSIll 
DON HART & TOM FOX 
HART / FOX MINOR SUBDIVISION 
LOCATED IN SEC 24 T 3N R 1W StB&M 
DAVIS COUNTY UT 
DRAWN BY SGR 
CHECKED BY ^ GR 
DATE 4 / 0 c / 9 A 
JOB NO 
SURVD BY SGR/M/DH 
CALC BY SGR 
FIELD 8K# 
COMP DRWG DONH 
SHEET DESCRIPTION 
SUBDIVISION 
PLAT 
